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Comments and Casenotes
The Parol Evidence Rule - A New Exception
Rinaudo v. Bloom1
Plaintiffs entered into a written contract with defen-
dants for the purchase and sale of a motel. The pertinent
parts of the contract provided that the purchase price was
$85,000 and that $10,000 had been paid prior to the signing,
that all deposit money was to be held by the sellers' real
estate agent until settlement, and that upon failure of pur-
chasers to secure a beer license, the buyers had a right to
cancel and recover "all deposit monies". The contract con-
cluded with an integration clause.
Plaintiffs failed to obtain the license and exercised their
right to cancel. This suit was brought to recover the deposit
money, the plaintiffs alleging that they had contracted to
purchase the motel for $100,000, that $25,000 had been paid
as a down payment of which $10,000 was paid by check and
$15,000 in cash, that an agreement of sale was subsequently
executed, and that for reasons unknown to the plaintiffs,
the defendants gave credit to the plaintiffs for the cash pay-
ment by setting out the purchase price as $85,000. Trial
was by jury, and the plaintiffs were permitted over objec-
tion to introduce oral testimony of the payment of the
$15,000 in cash immediately prior to the signing of the con-
tract. The verdict was for the plaintiffs and defendants
appealed, the principal question being whether the admis-
sion of this testimony constituted reversible error as a viola-
tion of the parol evidence rule. The Court of Appeals de-
cided that it did not, resting its decision on a statement in
the case of Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co.,2 and held that
the rule was not violated since the writing was integration
only of the terms remaining executory at the time of the
signing and delivery of the written contract. The decision
is important as a summary of law surrounding the rule and
as an indorsement of Professor McCormick's method of
applying it in jury cases, but it is open to criticism on two
grounds: first, it creates another "exception" to the rule
and, second, it does so on no authority other than the Dins-
more case, which, it is submitted, is not necessarily on point.
1120 A. 2d 184 (Md. 1956).
' 122 Md. 177, 89 A. 399 (1914).
RINAUDO v. BLOOM
The parol evidence rule was explained by the Court of
Appeals in 1823 as follows:
"By the rule of the common law, independent of the
statute of frauds and perjuries, parol proof is inadmis-
sible to contradict, add to, or vary the terms of a writ-
ten agreement. This principle is founded in the wisest
policy, it guards the chastity of written contracts
against all interpolations, by considering the agree-
ment as furnishing the best evidence of the intention
of the parties. It therefore shuts out all inquiry into
parol proof which can give a different sense to the
instrument."
Thus the rule is, as the courts have frequently pointed out,
a rule of substantive law, not a rule of evidence,4 since its
application is independent of the credibility of the evidence
offered. By definition, such a rule can apply only where a
writing exists which expresses the intent of the parties.
Under these two elements of existence and expression can
be grouped most of the so-called exceptions to the rule.
The majority, if not all, of these exceptions may just as
properly be thought of as criteria for determining whether
there is such a writing as the rule was fashioned to protect,5
i.e., for determining whether the parol evidence rule applies
in this situation in the first instance.
First then, the rule is applicable only where there is a
valid contractual writing,6 and therefore where the exist-
ence of the contractual act itself is controverted, extrinsic
evidence is admissible to prove the non-existence; for
example, the statement in many cases that the rule applies
except where the contract is impeached for fraud, duress,
or mistake,7 the presence of which prevent the necessary
8 Wesley v. Thomas, 6 H. & J. 24, 27 (Md., 1823).
4 Supra, n. 1, 188. "In other words: Where a Jural act is embodied in a
single memorial, all other utterances of the parties on that topic are legally
immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act."
9 WiomoRE, EvrDENOI (3rd ed., 1940) 76.
5 Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 20
(1929).
9 It is obvious that not all writings, but only those of a contractual nature
fall within the proscription of the rule. That non-contractual writings are
open to parol evidence, see Barger v. Collins, 7 H. & J. 213 (Md., 1826),
involving an account stated, and Courtney v. Knabe & Co. Mfg. Co., 97 Md.
499, 55 A. 614 (1903), dealing with letters.
' This statement appears as dictum in several leading cases, notably Kiser
v. Eberly, 200 Md. 242, 88 A. 2d 570 (1952), and Markoff v. Kreiner, 180
Md. 150, 23 A. 2d 19 (1941). Smith v. Bounds Package Corp., 206 Md. 74,
110 A. 2d 71 (1954), held parol evidence admissible to show mutual mis-
take, and Standard Motor Co. v. Peltzer, 147 Md. 509, 128 A. 451 (1925),
permitted the showing of fraud. See also Councill v. Sun Ins. Office, 146
Md. 137, 126 A. 229 (1924). Of. Rinaudo v. Bloom, supra, n. 1, 189.
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meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.' Where
the written act is not contractual in nature, but by way of
recital of a fact only, as a receipt,9 or the recital of consider-
ation in a deed,"0 it is open to interpretation by extrinsic
evidence. An independent agreement, separate from a
given writing may be proved, since as to that agreement
there is no written contract. Where the agreement is col-
lateral to the writing, i.e., shares a common consideration
with the writing or is made in consideration of its execu-
tion, the question must be answered: can the parties rea-
sonably be presumed to have intended the agreement
sought to be proved to be integrated in the writing." The
rule proceeds upon the presumption that all matters per-
taining to the transaction are integrated in the writing.'
This presumption that the writing was intended as the final
and full statement of the agreement is strengthened by an
integration clause" and usually made conclusive by men-
tion of the matter in the written contract. 4 Before the
court can present to the jury the question of whether
particular litigants intended integration the court must
decide in the abstract if the agreement is such as the parties
would not reasonably be expected to embody in the main
8In Furness-Withy & Co. v. Fahey, 127 Md. 333, 96 A. 619 (1915), In-
volving the issue of whether a certain writing was the agreement of the
parties, the court held that parol evidence is admissible to show that there
was never a real meeting of the minds. Lutz v. Porter, 206 Md. 595, 112 A.
2d 480 (1955), held such evidence admissible to show that a contract held
by a lawyer pending execution of a bond was not to become effective until
such execution.
9 Hirons v. Hubbell, 149 Md. 593, 132 A. 645 (1926), held that an unsealed
receipt may be shown to be false. Nealon v. Travers, 160 Md. 324, 153 A.
44 (1931), held that a check, indorsed and cashed, is prima facie evidence
of payment, but is, like an unsealed receipt, always open to explanation.
Cf. Rinaudo v. Bloom, supra, n. 1, 189.
10 Carr v. Hobbs, 11 Md. 285 (1857).
"Markoff v. Kreiner, supra, n. 7, 155:
"All prior and contemporaneous negotiations are merged in the
written instrument, which is treated as the exclusive medium for ascer-
taining the extent of their obligations."
12 Kikas v. Baltimore County, 200 Md. 360, 89 A. 2d 625 (1952), held that
an agreement to permit salvage of refuse by lessee of the premises used
as a dump was such that it could not be collateral but would be merged
in a lease of the premises.
" Rinaudo v. Bloom, 120 A. 2d 184, 189 (Md., 1956).
" Markoff v. Kreiner, supra, n. 7, 155, discussed more fully within, quoted
Chief Justice Fuller's explanation of collateral agreements given in Seitz v.
Brewers' Refrigerating Machine Oo., 141 U. S. 510 (1891), the third element
of which is that the agreement be such as the parties could not reasonably
be expected to embody in the contract. If 'the parties actually mention the
matter in the writing, this test cannot be met. Winslow v. Atz, 168 Md. 230,
249, 177 A. 272 (1935), cited 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1st ed., 1904) See. 2430
[now 3rd ed., 1940, Vol. IX, Sec. 2430], for the statement that if the matter
is, "mentioned, covered, or dealt with in the writing, then presumably the
writing was meant to represent all of the transactions on -that element; ..."
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contract and would naturally make dehors the written
instrument. If the answer is affirmative, proof of such
agreement does not impinge upon the written contract and
the rule does not apply.
Once the existence of the contractual act is established,
the problem arises of determining to what extent it ex-
presses the intent of the parties. Of course, if the meaning
of the writing is apparent upon its face, the rule may prop-
erly apply; but if the meaning is not readily ascertainable
or if there are latent ambiguities, extrinsic evidence is
necessarily admissible to aid in ascertaining the meaning,
though not to contradict or vary whatever part of the mean-
ing is clearly ascertainable.15
Application of the rule presents a practical problem
since it must be applied by the court to exclude certain
evidence from the fact finder, and to determine its applica-
tion, the court must first hear the evidence of the nature
of the agreement sought to be proved. Since in jury cases
this may present the paradox of allowing the evidence to
get to the jury in the course of the determination, McCor-
mick has suggested that the court first hear the testimony
out of the presence of the jury for the preliminary deter-
mination of whether the agreement is such that it does not
fall within the prohibition of the rule,' 6 a procedure which
the Court of Appeals in the Rinaudo case indorsed," but
which the trial court had not adopted.
In reciting the applications of the rule set out above, the
court was on firm ground with scores of cases as precedents.
But the final decision in the Rinaudo case rested on none of
the above. The payment of $15,000 prior to execution of
the contract in addition to the $10,000 recited therein was
not a "collateral agreement" within the Markoff v. Kreiner
test;" it was not independent, separate, and distinct from
the written instrument but dealt with a matter specifically
mentioned in the writing; it was inconsistent with and con-
tradicted the statement of the consideration which the
Globe Home Impvt. Co. v. McCarty, 204 Md. 513, 105 A. 2d 216 (1954),
held a "floor finishing" contract sufficiently ambiguous to permit testimony
of the surrounding circumstances. Parol evidence has been held admissible
to explain the meaning of the following words in the following cases: Levi v.
Schwartz, 201 Md. 575, 95 A. 2d 322 (1953), "coincide" in a deed; Applestein
v. Royal Realty Corp., 181 Md. 171, 28 A. 2d 830 (1942), "amortize" in a
contract to purchase real estate; Keyser v. Weintraub, 157 Md. 437, 146 A.
275 (1929), "loss" in a guaranty contract. Insley v. Myers, 192 Md. 292,
64 A. 2d 126 (1949), held parol evidence inadmissible to construe a plain,
unambiguous lease.
18 MCCORMicrK, EvIDENcm (1954), Sec. 216, pp. 439, 441.
17 Rinaudo v. Bloom, supra, n. 13, 190.
180 Md. 150, 23 A. 2d 19 (1941).
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court in the Rinaudo case at page 191, regarded as an
"important contractual term and not as a mere recital",
and it was an agreement to a matter such as the parties
would reasonably be expected to and did embody in the
main contract.
The court stated these two grounds for holding the parol
evidence admissible: first, "A somewhat narrow reason",
that the provision for return of "all deposit monies" was
capable of a broader interpretation than the $10,000 speci-
fically called for in the instrument; and second, that this
case was controlled by Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co.19
In the Dinsmore case, the vendor had sold an oven under a
conditional contract of sale which stated the purchase price
to be $275.90 payable monthly. A creditor of the vendee
sold the oven under attachment proceedings, and the pro-
ceeds were paid into court. In the resulting suit between
the vendor and the creditor for these proceeds, the condi-
tional contract of sale was put in evidence. The vendor
was allowed to testify over objection that the original sale
price was $450.90 and that this amount was decreased by
an allowance for an old oven accepted in trade at $125.00
and a down payment of $50.00 to the amount named in the
contract. The creditor appealed, alleging, inter alia, a viola-
tion of the parol evidence rule. As the vendor pointed out
in his brief, and as the court in the Rinaudo case noted,
it was immaterial whether the unpaid balance is computed
from $450.90 less trade-in and all payments or from $275.90
less subsequent payments; the result would be the same.
The Court in the Dinsmore case, however, without prece-
dent or explanation gratuitously stated that such an admis-
sion is ".... entirely proper and in no sense violates the gen-
eral rule...- 2o In this statement, the court in the Rinaudo
case found an exception to the general rule so strongly
stated that, "Unless the Dinsmore case is to be overruled,
the exception which it recognized appears to be controlling
in this case; and we are not prepared to overrule it."'"
122 Md. 177, 89 A. 399 (1914).
10 Ibid, 181.
Supra, n. 13, 193. For precedents to the contrary, note the following
language in Rafferty v. Butler, 133 Md. 430, 432, 102 A. 530 (1919) : "In 17
Cyc. 610, it is said and supported by authority, that 'the statement in a
contract of sale as to the price paid or to be paid by the purchaser is an
essential part of the contract and hence it cannot be varied or contradicted
by parol'." (Emphasis added.) Note also the language in Trotter v. Lewis,
185 Md. 528, 533, 45 A. 2d 329 (1946) ; "We specifically hold that a written
contract of sale is conclusive as to the time, mode and terms of payment,
and such provisions cannot be varied or contradicted by parol." Prior to
the Rinaudo case, the Dinsmore decision had been cited four times on
questions of sales law and once, in Sommers v. Dukes, 208 Md. 386, 394,
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Besides being a questionable use of precedent and be-
sides whatever unsettling effect this exception, whether
new or merely newly discovered, may have on the parol
evidence rule, it indicates a willingness on the part of the
court to administer ad hoc justice in a field of commercial
relations, an area where certainty in the law is perhaps
more important than justice in a particular case. In apply-
ing the Dinsmore dictum to the Rinaudo case, the court in
effect held that an executed portion of a contract is not
considered integrated in a subsequent writing and may be
proved by parol evidence, thus creating another real or
apparent exception to the rule.22 This raises the question
of whether a rule so riddled with exceptions is worth the
legal gymnastics of keeping it alive without being bound
by it in a given case.
Writers have tended to regard the rule and its excep-
tions, real or apparent, as a hopeless morass.2 Only one,
the late Professor Strahorn, saw any underlying unity.24
McCormick suggests that the rule may have originated as
an attempt on the part of judges to control juries who might
give undue weight to oral testimony and not enough to the
written word, and that its continued existence is felt to be
necessary to the stability of the business community.25
Corbin has come out frankly against it.2" In 1944 in the
118 A. 2d 660 (1955), on a question of parol evidence, as supporting the
statement that ".. . if any doubt arises from the language of a contract as
to the intention of the parties, extraneous evidence may be admitted to aid
the court in comprehending its meaning." Such a citation indicates that
the court did not regard Dinsmore as a new exception. 0/., n. 15, supra.
Assuming that the money was paid, there is still some doubt as to the
necessity of this exception to recover it. The plaintiffs could probably have
recovered on the common counts, subject, of course, to the rules of illegality.
The court pointed out at page 193 that the reason for not stating the full
consideration may have been concealment from some third party. The court
also discussed this method of recovery at page 193.
Wigmore opens his introduction to the parol evidence rule with a quota-
tion from Professor Thayer : "'Few things . . . are darker than this or
fuller of subtle difficulties'." Wigmore goes on to observe that due to the
subtlety and elusiveness of certain distinctions and improper terminology the
rule is attended with a confusion and obscurity which make it the most dis-
couraging subject in the whole field of evidence. 9 WIGmon, EVIENCE (3rd
ed., 1940) 3.
Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 20, 46
(1929). Even he recognized one exception "which permits the proof of
extrinsic facts to show that the parties to a transaction hold to each other
a different relation from the one resulting from the form of the written
transaction". E.g. A deed absolute on its face may be shown to be a mort-
gage or deed of trust and a joint or principal maker to be a surety. Wigmore
states that: 'There is no one and undivided Parol Evidence Rule." 9
WIOMOUR, EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940) 4.
0 McCoRmcic, EVIDENCE (1954), Sec. 210. If this is the reason, such
stability is not promoted by the creation of new exceptions.
WCorbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L. J. 603 (1944).
1956)
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Yale Law Journal he declared that it would have been
better if no such rule had ever been stated as preventing
the introduction of testimony but that the inquiry should
be whether the parties by the writing made a substituted
contract discharging and annulling previous agreements,
and that on this question no relevant testimony should be
excluded.
"This is what the wiser courts, seeking justice in
each separate case, have in truth been doing. Operating
at times through exceptions and limitations, while not
denying the majesty of the supposed rule, they have
not precluded the parties from 'showing forth the
transaction in all its length and breadth'."' 7
This may be what the Court of Appeals was doing in the
Rinaudo case. If so, and granting that substantial justice
may have been done, the question remains whether it would
not be better to strike the rule altogether than to continue
to honor it more in the breach than in the observance. As
Corbin points out, if the parties mutually assent to a writ-
ing as the complete and accurate expression of the terms
of their agreement, the proof of any antecedent under-
standing is immaterial: the written contract prevails be-
cause it is the later in time, with or without any parol
evidence rule.28 Certainly any rule which functions to
obscure the true factual situation in favor of an artificial
conclusion of law may be looked askance; but if the rule
is basically invalid or if the conditions which gave rise
to it have substantially changed, the simpler course tending
to less confusion is to say so and dischard it in toto rather
than whitle it away by exceptions.
LOWELL R. Bow
The "Lord Mansfield Rule" And The
Presumption Of Legitimacy
Clark v. State'
In a bastardy proceeding instituted by Patricia Skosnick,
Ronald Clark was accused of the paternity of her child con-
ceived prior but born subsequent to her marriage to Joseph
1 Ibid, 632, quoting from Saltzman v. Barson, 239 N. Y. 332, 146 N. E. 618,
619 (1925).
0 Ibid, 633. For a later statement of Corbin's ideas see 3 CoRmN,
CONTRACTS (1951 ed.), See. 573.
1118 A. 2d 366 (Md. 1955).
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